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Abstract
The IPCC recommends the use of carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) technologies in order to achieve the Kyoto environmental goals.
This paper sheds light on this issue by assessing the optimal strategy re-
garding the long-term use of CCS technologies. The aim is to analyze
the optimal CCS policy when the sequestration rate is endogenous, be-
ing hence one specic tool of the environmental policy. We develop a
simple growth model and therefore exhibit the main driving forces that
should determine the optimal CCS policy. We show that, under some
conditions on the cost of extractions, CCS may be a long-term solution to
curb carbon emissions. Besides, we show that the social planner choose to
decrease over time the rate of capture and sequestration. Next, we derive
the decentralized equilibrium outcome by considering the programs of the
fossil resource-holder and of the representative consumer. Finally, we de-
termine the environmental policy, i.e. the carbon tax scheme, as well as
the the dynamics of the fossil fuel price that implement the optimum.
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1 Introduction
The IPCCs report [17] recommends the development and the use of carbon
capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to achieve the environ-
mental goals imposed by the Kyoto Protocol. CCS is a geoengineering technique
for the long-term storage1 of carbon dioxide or other forms of carbon. Carbon
dioxide is usually captured from the atmosphere through biological, chemical
or physical processes. CO2 may be captured as a pure by-product in processes
related to petroleum rening or from ue gases from power generation. The
carbon dioxide might then be permanently stored away from the atmosphere.
It has been argued that CCS applied to a conventional power plant could re-
duce CO2 emissions to the atmosphere by approximately 80-90% compared to
a plant without CCS. The IPCC estimates that the economic potential of CCS
could be between 10% and 55% of the total carbon mitigation e¤ort until year
2100 (IPCC [17]). Despite the lack of certainty about the long-term economic
e¢ ciency of the CCS, many countries have already launched some experiences,
which are still operating. For instance, three important industrial-scale storage
projects are in operation: Sleipner is the oldest project and is located in the
North Sea (Finland); the Weyburn-Midale CO2 Project is currently the worlds
largest carbon capture and sequestration project (Canada); the site of In Salah
(Algeria) is a natural gas reservoir located in In Salah.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestra-
tion policy. We hence analyze what should be the CCS policy in a deterministic
world.2 The CCS technologies has motivated a number of empirical studies, via
complex integrated assessment models (see McFarland et al. [21], Edmonds et
al. [7], Kurosawa [18], Gitz et al. [10], Edenhofer et al. [6], Gerlagh [8], Ger-
lagh and van der Zwaan [9], Grimaud et al. [13]). These papers consider that
the existing technology allows sequestrating a constant fraction of the carbon
emissions. They generally conclude that the early introduction of sequestration
can lead to a substantial decrease in the cost of environmental externality. A
high level of complexity for such operational models, aimed at dening some
specic climate policy, may be required so as to take into account the various
interactions at hand. Conversely, in this paper, we consider a stylized model so
as to exhibit the main driving forces that should determine the optimal CCS
policy, in a very simple economy. While a generic abatement option can take
1 It includes gaseous storage in various deep geological formations (including saline forma-
tions and exhausted gas elds), liquid storage in the ocean, and solid storage by reaction of
CO2 with metal oxides to produce stable carbonates.
2One direct extension, among others, is to take into account the uncertainty linked to
CSS e¢ ciency. The CSS in action are still recent and we do not know exactly the full conse-
quences of such abatement technologies, in terms of environmental consequences (on oceans
for instance), or in terms of e¢ ciency once we consider the leakage problems.
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several forms, such as sequestration by forests or pollution reduction at the
source, in this paper we are mainly concerned with the rate of carbon capture
and sequestration, although we also introduce the limited size and an access
cost of the reservoir. Thus, and by contrast to these previous models, we do not
consider the optimal level of carbon emissions to capture and store to achieve a
given goal, but we come out with an analytical value of the instantaneous rate
of capture and sequestration, that is the optimal rate of storage.
Following Hotteling [16], Dasgupta and Heal [5] and Hartwick [14] who an-
alyze the optimal use (i.e. exploitation and/or depletion) of environmental re-
sources,3 we consider an optimal growth path of an economy facing a dilemma of
consumption vs. pollution. The framework introduced in this paper, the Ram-
sey model, is quite similar to the one used in the papers dealing with optimal
pollution control (van der Ploeg and Withagen; [23], Gradus and Smulders [11],
Ayong Le Kama [1], Ayong Le Kama and Schubert [3], [4]). La¤orgue et alii.
([19], [20]) and Ragot and Schubert [22] have already studied the theoretical
consequences of the CCS for some specic cases. La¤orgue et alii.([19], [20])
consider the energy substitution issues when the economy faces a ceiling on the
stock of pollution in the atmosphere. Ragot and Schubert ([22]) analyze the
temporality of sequestration in agricultural soils by considering the asymmet-
ric dynamic process. Finally, Grimaud and Rouge [12] study the implications
of the CCS technology availability on the optimal use of polluting exhaustible
resources and on optimal climate policies, within an endogenous growth frame-
work. They conclude that CCS is detrimental to output growth. But these
papers do not consider the CCS technology as a particular tool for the envi-
ronmental policy. Moreover, in these papers, the rate of change of the stock of
pollution or of the stock of the environmental resource, that is the natural rate
of absorption/regeneration, is given. The framework introduced here is di¤erent
since we determine endogenously the optimal rate of carbon sequestration, as if
the rate of change of the stock of pollution becomes endogenous. This frame-
work originates from Ayong Le Kama and Fodha [2] who study the optimal rate
of nuclear waste storage, but in a partial equilibrium case.
The sketch of the model is the following. We consider an economy with only
one good which is fossil energy fuel. This good comes from the extraction of
a non-renewable and given resource stock. Its consumption generates environ-
mental damages due to the release of carbon ows into the atmosphere. For
simplication, we assume that the ows of carbon are proportional to the level
of consumption. Consumption and pollution enter in a separable way into the
utility function. Besides, we assume that the social planner can capture and
store a part of the carbon ow in some appropriately deep sinks. Hence, the
3See for example Heal [15] for a survey on these topics.
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social planner goal is to choose the optimal CCS rate policy. We show, under
some conditions on the cost of extractions, that CCS may be a long-term so-
lution to curb carbon emissions. Next, we derive the decentralized equilibrium
outcome by considering the programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the
representative consumer. Finally, we determine the environmental policy, i.e.
the carbon tax scheme, as well as the the dynamics of the fossil fuel price that
implement the optimum.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 studies the optimal dynamics of fossil resource extraction and sequestration.
It also provides an illustration of optimal trajectories by using some specied
functional forms. Section 4 derives the decentralized equilibrium outcome and
characterizes the carbon tax trajectory that implements the optimum. The last
section concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy in which, at each date t, the unique consumption
good is a ow of fossil energy fuel xt. This good exhibits two main properties.
First, it comes from the extraction of a non-renewable and initially given re-
source stock X0. The current fossil resource stock Xt thus evolves over time as
follows:
_Xt =  xt (1)
We denote by c(Xt) the full marginal delivery cost of the fossil fuel, which
includes the extraction cost of the resource, the cost of industrial processing
(rening) and the transportation cost, so that the resource is ready for use by
the consumer. This cost is assumed to be decreasing and convex in Xt, thus
growing as the resource is depleted in order to reect the fact that the more
accessible deposits are exploited rst.
Second, consumption of fossil energy provides utility but it also generates
some environmental damages due to the release of carbon ows into the at-
mosphere associated to the combustion of the fossil fuel. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we assume additive separability between utility and damage (i.e. marginal
utility is not impacted by pollution). We denote by u(xt) the instantaneous
ow of utility provided by the consumption of xt units of fossil energy and by
v(Pt) the instantaneous ow of damage associated with the atmospheric carbon
stock Pt. We assume that u(:) has the standard properties (increasing, concave,
Inada) and that function v(:) is increasing and convex. We also assume that
the utility and damage ows are expressed in monetary terms and can thus be
viewed as the consumer surplus. Finally, net utility ows are discounted at rate
, where  is the pure rate of time preferences.
4
The unitary carbon content of fossil fuel is  so that, without any abate-
ment at the pollution source, the instantaneous carbon emissions would be xt.
We assume that a CCS device is available from the initial date and we note t
the rate of sequestration, i.e. the proportion of carbon emissions that is cap-
tured and stored into geological reservoirs. The instantaneous ow of carbon
sequestration is then equal to st = txt and the dynamics of storage is given
by:
_St = st = txt (2)
where St is the cumulated quantity of carbon stored into carbon sinks, S0 been
given. We also assume that the maximum amount of CO2 that can be captured
and stored is limited by the physical capacity S:
St  S 8t (3)
To motivate this assumption, we can argue that carbon emissions are mainly
stockpiled into empty geological deposits, such as oil sinks or gas elds, and
those potential reservoirs are available themselves in nite quantities. CCS
is costly and we assume that the sequestration cost D(t; xt) depends both
on the level of emissions and the rate of sequestration.4 For simplicity, we
impose D(t; xt) = xtd(t), where function d(:) is increasing and convex in
t. Then, sequestration costs are linear in carbon emissions, but not in the rate
of sequestration in order to reect decreasing returns in the associated CCS
technology.
Finally the atmospheric carbon accumulation process is captured by the
following dynamic constraint:
_Pt = (1  t)xt   Pt; P0 given (4)
where (1  t)xt measures the carbon emissions net of abatement and  is the
natural rate of decay of the atmosphere.
3 The optimal extraction and CCS paths
3.1 Optimal program and rst-order conditions
The program of the social planner consists in choosing a fossil fuel consumption
prole fxtgt0 and a sequestration rate trajectory ftgt0 that maximize the
sum of the discounted net current surplus:
max
fxt;tg
Z 1
0
[u(xt)  v(Pt)  c(Xt)xt   xtd(t)] e tdt (5)
4For the sake of computational conveniences, we do not assume here that the sequestration
cost depends on the cumulated past storage St.
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subject to constraints (1)-(4) and to:
xt  0 (6)
0  t  1 (7)
Here we make several points before solving this optimal program. As usu-
ally assumed, we will not consider the non-negativity constraints on the state
variables. From the Inada conditions, the non-negativity constraint on xt will
never be binding, except asymptotically, so we do not consider it further here.
Finally, we examine the case where the economy is not constrained by (7) and
we will check this condition ex-post.
The corresponding Hamiltonian in current value writes:
H = u(xt)  v(Pt)  c(Xt)xt   xtd(t)
 txt + ttxt + t [(1  t)xt   Pt] + t
 
S   St

where t, t, t are the co-state variables associated with state equations (1),
(2) and (4). Those variables read respectively as the scarcity rent of the fossil
resource (@Wt=@Xt), the implicit (social) marginal value of carbon capture and
storage (@Wt=@St), the implicit (social) marginal cost of releasing CO2 into the
atmosphere (@Wt=@Pt). Intuitively, along any optimal path, we may obtain
non-negative values for t and non-positive values for t and t. Moreover, t
denotes the social cost of sequestration coming from a tightening in the limited
capacity constraint of reservoir, formally the Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (3).
The rst-order conditions are:
@H
@xt
= 0) u0(xt) = c(Xt) + t + [d(t)  tt]  (1  t)t (8)
@H
@t
= 0) d0(t)  t =  t (9)
@H
@Xt
= t   _t ) _t = t + xtc0(Xt) (10)
@H
@St
= t   _t ) _t = t + t (11)
@H
@Pt
= t   _t ) _t = (+ )t + v0(Pt) (12)
The complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions are:
t( S   St) = 0; t  0 (13)
lim
t!1tXte
 t = 0 (14)
lim
t!1tSte
 t = 0 (15)
lim
t!1 tPte
 t = 0 (16)
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Equation (8) equates the marginal utility of consuming one unit of fossil
energy with its full marginal cost. This last term can be decomposed in: i)
the marginal extraction cost c(Xt), ii) the resource scarcity rent t, iii) the
full cost of sequestration [d(t)   tt] by unit of fossil fuel use, and iv) the
marginal social cost of augmenting the atmospheric carbon stock by the ow
of residual emissions, i.e. (1  t)t. Equation (9) says that the full marginal
cost of carbon burying (left-hand-side) must be equal to its social marginal
gain in terms of atmospheric carbon concentration reduction (right-hand side).
Equation (10) is no other than the Hotelling rule in the case of stock-dependent
extraction costs. Equation (11) implies that the implicit marginal value of CCS
must grow at the pure rate of time preferences , augmented by t which reects
the limited capacity of carbon sinks. Note that, from (13), this last term is nil
as long as the reservoir is not fullled and non-negative otherwise, which means
that t obeys to the Hotelling rule only during the phase along which CCS is
active. Finally, equation (12) says that the social marginal cost of atmospheric
CO2 accumulation must grow at a rate equal to the sum of the pure rate of time
preference augmented by the natural rate of decay,5 and the marginal damage.
Finally, remark that replacing (   ) by d0() from (9), the rst-order
condition (8) can be rewritten as:
u0(xt) = c(Xt) + t + [d(t)  td0(t)  t] (17)
3.2 Optimal dynamics
First, we solve the non-homogeneous di¤erential equations (11) and (12) by
using the associated transversality conditions (15) and (16), respectively, in
order to identify initial values 0 and 0. For any t, solutions are given by
(stars in exponent refer here to optimality):
t =  
Z 1
t
se
 (s t)ds (18)
t =  
Z 1
t
v0(Ps)e (+)(s t)ds (19)
Since t  0 from (13) and v0(:) > 0 by assumption, we can then check that t
and t are non-positive for any t. The social marginal cost of sequestration (by
unit of CO2 emitted) is equal to the discounted sum over time of the instan-
taneous costs of the reservoir capacity constraint, from t up to 1. The social
5This rst term can be seen as a modied discount rate in order to take into account
that emitting an additional unit of carbon today yields a marginal return  tomorrow, but it
also increases the future marginal regeneration of the atmosphere by .
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marginal cost of atmospheric carbon concentration is equal to the discounted
sum (at rate + ) over time of instantaneous marginal damages, from t up to
1.
Next, to solve the optimal program in this deterministic case, we need to
nd the optimal expression of t. Let us assume that the carbon reservoir is
fullled at a nite date t <<1. We will discuss about an eventual asymptotic
fullling up of the reservoir later. Obviously, t is determined from St = S
and thus depends on the size S of the reservoir. For any date t > t, we have
_St = 0, which implies txt = 0. But due to the Inada conditions that we
have imposed, the fossil resource stock can be exhausted only asymptotically,
which nally implies t = 0 for any t  t. Since, in that case, (9) writes
d0(0) = t   t, we must have _t   _t = 0, 8t > t. From (11) and (12), we thus
obtain t = t + v
0(Pt)  d0(0), 8t  t, which, by using (19), implies:
t =
(
0 ; t < t
v0(Pt)  d0(0)  
R1
t
v0(Ps)e (+)(s t)ds ; t  t
(20)
Recall that t reads as the optimal social value of the limited capacity constraint
of carbon reservoirs or, in other words, as the marginal increase of social welfare
coming from a marginal increase of S. It is equal to zero as long as the reservoir
is not lled, and it takes some positive value thereafter. Moreover, from the
non-negativity condition (13), we must impose the following constraint:
1


v0(Pt)  
Z 1
t
v0(Ps)e (+)(s t)ds

> d0(0); 8t > t (21)
which states that it is optimal to fulll up the carbon sink in nite time if and
only if the net marginal damage divided by the social discount rate at some
future date after fullling is larger than the initial marginal sequestration cost
by unit of CO2 emission. Here, the net marginal damage at date t is dened
by the instantaneous marginal damage v0(Pt) at this date, diminished by the
discounted sum (at rate +) from t up to innity of all the marginal damages
that will be avoided owing to natural cleaning-up of the atmosphere.
Replacing t by its expression (20) into (18), expanding computations and
after simplications, we obtain:
t =
(   R1t v0(Ps)e (s t)e (s t)ds+ d0(0)e (t t) ; t < t
  R1
t
v0(Ps)e (+)(s t)ds+ d0(0) ; t  t
(22)
We determine now the optimal dynamics of the two control variables xt and
t. We start with t by di¤erentiating (9) with respect to time and by replacing
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_t and _t by their expressions coming from (11) and (12), respectively:
d00(t) _t = t + t   (+ )t   v0(Pt) (23)
Using (9) again, it comes:
d00(t) _t = d
0(t) + t   t   v0(Pt) (24)
Proceeding in the same way with xt (i.e. di¤erentiating (17) with respect to
time and replacing the time derivatives of the co-state variables by their corre-
sponding expressions), we obtain after simplications:
u00(xt) _xt = (t   t)  td00(t) _t    [t + v0(Pt)] (25)
which, once have been used (24), becomes:
u00(xt) _xt = [t   t   td0(t)]   ftt + (1  t)[t + v0(Pt)]g (26)
Using (17) again and replacing t by its expression coming from (24), we nally
get:
u00(xt) _xt = [u0(xt) c(Xt) d(t)+td0(t)]  [td00(t) _t + t + v0(Pt)]
(27)
where t is dened by (19).
In the next subsection, we provide an analytical example of optimal seques-
tration and consumption trajectories.
3.3 Analytical example
We rst postulate that the marginal damage is constant over time: v0(Pt) = v,
8t  0. With this analytical simplication, expressions (19), (20) and (22)
become:
t =
 v
+ 
(28)
t =
8<: 0 ; t <
t

h
v
+   d0(0)
i
; t  t
(29)
t =
8><>:
 
h
v
+   d0(0)
i
e (t t) ; t < t
 
h
v
+   d0(0)
i
; t  t
(30)
Assuming a constant marginal damage leads to constant implicit costs of reser-
voir limited capacity constraint  and atmospheric CO2 concentrations . This
last result implies that the net present value of future damages, discounted at
rate ( + ) is constant over time. Moreover, the implicit cost of CCS t be-
comes constant at the date at which the carbon reservoir is lled. Beforehand,
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it is increasing over time and continuity condition at t = t is satised. Remark
that the existence condition (21) writes now:
v
+ 
> d0(0) (31)
which implies that the net present value of future damages must be larger than
the initial marginal sequestration cost in order to provide incentives enough for
CCS.
We have next recourse to the same quadratic CCS cost function than in
Gerlagh and van der Zwaan [9], and which is dened as follows:
d(t) = t

1 +

2
t

(32)
where ,  > 0 is the index of convexity of this function, i.e. d00(:) = .
Remark that the initial marginal sequestration cost by unit of emission is now
unitary, i.e. d0(0) = 1. Consequently, the existence condition (21) is reduced
to v >  + , i.e. the instantaneous marginal damage must be larger than the
modiedsocial discount rate. Introducing these specications into (24) yields
to:
_t = t +
1


   

v
+ 
  1

(33)
Given (29) and the fact that t = 0 for any t  t by denition of t, the solution
of the non-homogeneous di¤erential equation (33) is:
t =
8<:
1


v
+   1
 
1  e (t t) ; t < t
0 ; t  t
(34)
where the initial value of t is given by:
0 =
1


v
+ 
  1

1  e t

(35)
Let us nally turn to the computation of the optimal energy consumption
path. Using the analytical specications introduced above, (27) reduces to:
u00(xt) _xt = 

u0(xt)  c(Xt)  t

1 +

2
t

  (1  t)
v
+ 

 t (36)
which, by using (29), can be expanded as follows:
_xt =
8><>:

u00(xt)
h
u0(xt)  c(Xt) + t jt<t

v
+   1  2t jt<t

  v+
i
; t < t

u00(xt)
h
u0(xt)  c(Xt)  v+
i
; t  t
(37)
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where t jt<t is determined from (34). Once t have been replaced replaced
by its optimal expression (34) into (36), we get an autonomous system of non-
homogeneous di¤erential equations in (xt; Xt)t0, together with (1), that can
be solved. From the determination of optimal controls t and x

t , we will next
be able to characterize St and P

t . Finally, from the continuity condition on
stock St, we will characterize the optimal date t of carbon reservoir lling up,
depending upon the limited capacity S and the other parameters of the model.
However, at this step, we need functional forms for u(:) and c(:) to solve the
problem at the end. We then assume that utility is CES and that the marginal
cost of extraction is constant:
u(xt) =
x1 t
1   and c(Xt) = c (38)
where  and c are strictly positive parameters.
Eliminating the stock e¤ect on fossil resource extraction signicantly sim-
plies the problem since it make di¤erential equation (10) homogeneous. When
the marginal extraction cost is constant, we recover the standard Hotelling rule
_t = t, whose solution is 

t = 0e
t, where 0 is such that
R1
0
xt = X0.
First-order (17) condition can be thus rewritten as:
x t = c+ 0e
t   

2t
2
+ t

= c+
v
+ 
+ 0e
t   
2
t
2
(39)
Given (34), this expression is equivalent to:
xt =
8>>><>>>:

c+ v+ + 0e
t   2

v
+   1
2  
1  e (t t)2  1 ; t < t
h
c+ v+ + 0e
t
i  1
; t  t
(40)
and then, the initial energy consumption level is:
x0 =
"
c+
v
+ 
+ 0   
2

v
+ 
  1
2 
1  e t
2#  1
(41)
All these ndings are summarized into the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal sequestration rate and the optimal energy con-
sumption ft ; xt g are characterized by:
t =
8<:
1


v
+   1
 
1  e (t t) ; t < t
0 ; t  t
(42)
xt =

c+
v
+ 
+ 0e
t   
2
t
2
  1
; t  0 (43)
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where the couple of variables ft; 0g is determined by the following system
of equations: Z 1
0
xt = X0 (44)

Z t
0
tx

t dt = S (45)
Those solutions6 are illustrated in Figure (1). Since _ =   

v
+   1

e (t t)
< 0, the optimal sequestration rate starts from its initial value 0 as dened by
(35), and declines over time up to 0 which is reached at date t, as showed in the
northeast quadrant of Figure (1). The northwest quadrant draws the optimal
fossil energy as a function of the optimal sequestration rate. From (42), for any
t < t, (43) can be rewritten as:
x(t ) =

c+
v
+ 
+ 0e
t   0

+ 
v     

t  

2
2t
  1
(46)
that is as an optimal energy consumption policy function depending on the
sequestration rate. It is easy to verify that such a function is increasing and
convex in .
The southwest quadrant is a purely technical device to show how the energy
consumption is derived from the sequestration rate at the same time, which is
nally illustrated in the southeast quadrant of Figure (1). We thus obtain an
optimal consumption trajectory that is declining over time and continuous at
t = t, but that exhibits a kink at t = t (i.e. its slope is discontinuous at this
point of time). Note that, for any t  t, the rest of the optimal trajectory is
characterized by (43) when t = 0. As expected, the fossil resource exhaustion
occurs then asymptotically.
Let us now check the existence conditions of the optimal solutions mentioned
in Proposition 1. First, a direct implication of t  0 is that t  0 for any
t. Second, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for having t smaller than 1 is
0  1. Such a condition leads to:
t   1

ln

1  (+ )
v     

(47)
Condition (47) also provides some insights about the value of t. If v > ( +
)(+1), (47) guarantees that carbon reservoir is fullled in nite time. Else, t
can be nite as well as innite. Finally, we have xt  0 for any t  t and xt > 0,
6We have here derived the analytical solution using a CES utility function. However, we
can also write the optimal extraction for any class of utility function u(x). In the general case,
expression (43) can be rewritten as: xt = u0 1

c+ v
+
+ 0et   
2
t
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
:
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Figure 1: Optimal sequestration rate and fossil energy consumption
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Condition for: v  +  +  < v  (+ 1)(+ ) (+ 1)(+ ) < v
t > 0 No Yes Yes
t  1 Yes Yes Yes
t nite Not necessary Not necessary Yes
Table 1: Conditions of existence
which insures that xt > 0 for any t < t since x

t is monotonically decreasing
over time. Table (1) summarizes these ndings.
4 Decentralization of the economy and imple-
mentation of the optimum
In this section, we decentralize the economy which have been studied above
by considering the individual programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the
consumer. We assume perfect competitive markets and we denote by pt and rt
the fossil fuel price and the real interest rate on nancial markets, respectively.
In order to correct the environmental externality, we introduce a carbon tax
prole f tg1t=0. Note that, due to the CCS device, the tax applies on the sole
part of carbon emissions which are e¤ectively released into the atmosphere after
sequestration. In that sense, carbon taxation is disconnected from the fossil
resource use.
The resource-holder chooses the extraction path fxtg1t=0 that maximizes the
discounted sum over time of its current prots
R1
0
[pt c(Xt)]xt exp

  R t
0
rsds

dt
subject to the constraint (1). First-order conditions imply:
_pt = rt[pt   c(Xt)] (48)
which is no other than the standard Hotelling rule with extraction costs, and
which states that the resource rent must grow at the real interest rate.
The program of the resource-user consists in choosing the consumption and
sequestration rate trajectories fxtg1t=0 and ftg1t=0 that maximize
R1
0
[u(xt)  
xtd(t)  ptxt    t(1  t)xt] exp ( t)dt, subject to constraints (2), (3) and
(7). As in the previous section, we examine the case where the decision-maker
is not constrained by (7), which leads to the following rst-order conditions:
u0(xt) = d(t) + pt +  t(1  t)  tet (49)
d0(t) =  t + 
e
t (50)
_et = 
e
t + 
e
t (51)
where, by analogy with the optimal program, et and 
e
t are, respectively, the
multipliers associated with constraints (2) and (3), but now expressed at the
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equilibrium. Di¤erentiating (49) with respect to time and using (50), it comes:
u00(xt) _xt = _pt +  _ t   td00(t) _t (52)
Along any equilibrium trajectory, pt is governed by the dynamic condition (48)
so that, after simplications and using (49) again, (52) can be rewritten as:
u00(xt) _xt = rt fu0(xt)  c(Xt)  [d(t)  td0(t) +  t]g+  _ t   td00(t) _t
(53)
There exists a particular equilibrium fxet ( t); et ( t)g associated with any carbon
tax trajectory. This set of equilibria is characterized by the condition (53) above.
By analogy between this condition and the corresponding condition (27), we can
determine the carbon tax trajectory that implements the optimum. Noting that
the optimal interest rate must be equal to the social time preference index, i.e.
rot = .
7 Then, 8t  0, the optimal tax scheme ot is such that:
_ot = 
o
t   t   v0(P t ) (54)
where t is dened by (19) and where P

t denotes the trajectory of atmospheric
carbon accumulation that is followed at the optimum. Results about the imple-
mentation of the optimum are summarized in the following proposition.8
Proposition 2 The optimal environmental policy and the associated interest
rate and fossil fuel price are given by:
ot = 
o
0e
t  
Z t
0
[s + v
0(P s )]e
 (s t)ds (55)
rot =  (56)
pot = p
o
0e
t   
Z t
0
c(Xs )e
 (s t)ds (57)
7We would obtain the same implementation requirement by considering the budget con-
straint of the consumer who can save money and hold a stock of bonds Bt. In its simplest
form, this constraint would be _Bt = rBt   ptxt   xtd(t)   t(1  t)xt.
8Another decentralization option is to consider that the representative energy user directly
consumes nal energy services and that the CCS deployment is undertaken by the fossil
resource-holder (now the energy sector). This last sector also bears the carbon tax burden so
that its program becomes:
max
Z 1
0
f[pt   c(Xt)]xt   xtd(t)   t(1  t)xtg e 
R t
0 rsdsdt
subject to constraints (1), (2) and (3). Static and dynamic rst order conditions of this
program can be reduced in:
_pt = rt

pt   c(Xt)  [ t + d(t)  td0(t)]
	
The consumer intertemporal simple calculus gives u0(xt) = pt and it is easy to verify that
Proposition 2 remains valid. In the case where the budget constraint of the consumer, _Bt =
rBt   ptxt, is taken into account, we would obtain:
u00(xt) _xt = u0(xt)

  rt + _pt
pt

and conditions (54) and (56) would be su¢ cient to insure the coincidence between the equi-
librium outcome and the optimum.
15
where the initial values of ot and p
o
t are determined by:
o0 =
1

[u0(x0)  d(0) + 0d0(0)  po0] (58)
po0 = c(X0) + 

0; with 

0 s.t.
Z 1
0
xt dt = X0 (59)
Finally, we illustrate those ndings by using the same analytical forms than
the ones that have been introduced in the previous section. Under specications,
we obtain pot = c + 

0 exp (t) from (57) and (59). From (55), the specied
optimal tax trajectory writes ot = 
o
0 exp(t)+(1 exp(t))v=(+). However,
from (58), we nd an initial level of tax equal to v=(+ ). This implies that,
in the specied version of the model, the optimal carbon tax is constant over
time and equal to ot = v=(+), 8t  0. The optimal carbon price at any time
t should be equal to the sum from t up to 1 of the future marginal damage
involved by the emission at time t of one unit of carbon and discounted at rate
( + ) in order to take into account that carbon is naturally absorbed into
the atmosphere at rate  by unit of time. Obviously, in the special case where
instantaneous marginal damages are considered as constant, the optimal carbon
tax should also be constant over time.
5 Conclusion
Following the IPCCs report [17], which recommended the development and
the use of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to
achieve the environmental goals, dened by the Kyoto Protocol, the issue we
have addressed in this paper concerns the optimal strategy regarding the long-
term use of carbon capture and sequestration technologies.
The aim of this paper was to study the optimal carbon capture and seques-
tration policy. We then tried to analyze what should be the CCS optimal policy
in a deterministic world. We have shown within this simple model that, under
some conditions on the cost of extractions, CCS may be a long-term solution for
the carbon emissions problem. Besides, it is also shown that the social planner
will optimally choose to decrease the rate of capture and sequestration. We have
also introduced a decentralized economy by considering the individual program
of the fossil resource-holder and the one of the representative consumer. This
helped us to compute analytically the optimal environmental policy, that is the
optimal tax scheme, and also the optimal fossil fuel price prole.
However, all this results are obtained in a deterministic world. One direct
and natural extension of the model, among others, might be to take into account
the uncertainty linked to CCS e¢ ciency. The CCS technologies in action are
still recent and we do not know exactly the full consequences of such abatement
16
technologies, in terms of environmental consequences (on oceans for instance),
or in terms of e¢ ciency once we consider the leakage problems.
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